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Cooper, William J. We Have the War upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War,
November 1860-April 1861. Knopf, $30.00 ISBN 978-1-4000-4200-5
A Reassessment of the Secession Crisis
A prolific scholar, William J. Cooper, has made major contributions to our
understanding of southern history, especially in the Civil War era. More than
thirty years ago, he clearly and convincingly affirmed slavery’s centrality to the
1
politics of the antebellum white South. Later, his thoughtful, deeply researched,
and smoothly-written biography of Jefferson Davis unflinchingly depicted that
major Mississippi planter’s attachment to the South’s “peculiar institution" and
the role it played in his opting for secession.2
Cooper’s latest book re-examines the event-filled half-year between
Lincoln’s election in November 1860 and Fort Sumter and its aftermath. And it
is built around a consequential and strongly-made argument. He depicts the Civil
War as a resistible, repressible tragedy and lays responsibility for its occurrence
principally at the feet of Abraham Lincoln and his Republican Party. Taking the
white South’s dedication to slavery as a given, Cooper suggests that both
secession and war could (and should) have been avoided if Lincoln and his party
colleagues had taken the wishes, grievances, and demands of the South more
seriously and responded to them more wisely, reasonably, and fairly in 1860-61.
More specifically, they should have abandoned the platform on which Lincoln
had just been elected (which pledged to halt slavery’s expansion into the federal
territories) and agreed instead to John J. Crittenden’s proposal to divide those
territories between slavery’s friends and foes and to permit slavery’s spread into
any additional territories that might be “thereafter acquired" further south
(presumably in the Caribbean or central America). When the Confederacy fired
upon and seized Fort Sumter, furthermore, the Republican White House should
not have reacted by calling the nation to arms.

Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2012

1

Civil War Book Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7

Cooper is not shy about identifying his heroes and villains. The former
include “Upper South Conservatives" like Kentucky’s Crittenden and North
Carolina’s John A. Gilmer. Such men “disliked secession, most rejecting it
altogether" (95). The author admires their “eloquent plea for conciliation" (209).
After all, he tells us, they merely “asked for fairness in the territories" -- as
defined by Crittenden’s proposal (177).
Had Republicans done their patriotic duty, Cooper plainly believes, they
would have accepted those terms. Unfortunately, Lincoln and company refused.
That makes them the heavies of this story. The author especially dislikes those
he describes as the “gang" of abolitionist “hard-liners," the “antislavery zealots"
on the Republican Party’s left flank (61-2, 79). Since they “demanded an
immediate end to slavery," he tells us, it comes as no surprise that they
adamantly opposed any concessions on the territorial question (62). But while
they “professed" to take that stand out of “moral purity," he adds, some of them
acted on considerably baser motives –- concern “that backing compromise
‘would disband the Republican party’" by alienating a major part of its
constituency (62).
But Cooper holds the party’s mainstream at least equally guilty. Less
politically radical, those men had the numbers necessary to isolate the
“hard-liners." But in their “obstinacy" they, too, rejected “any stratagem to settle
the territorial question" (97, 101). Instead, they preferred simply to stand
“arrayed atop the monument" of their party’s anti-slavery electoral platform
“chanting the shibboleth of ‘no territorial compromise,’" endlessly “trumpeting
the same no-territorial-compromise anthem" (111, 112).
The buck, however, really stopped with Abraham Lincoln. He unfortunately
“defined compromise as giving in or submitting," and refused to do such a thing
(139).3 And by rejecting all the Crittenden-type deals on the table during the
secession season, Lincoln needlessly precipitated the incredibly bloody war (79).
The Republican leader did that, says Cooper, because of “his visceral antislavery
commitment," his insistence on thinking and acting sectionally rather than
nationally, and “his ignorance of the South," its goals, needs, and likely response
to his intransigence (73). Just as responsible and regrettable as these qualities
was Lincoln’s “vigorous partisanship." Lincoln, Cooper complains, “approached
the crisis not as president-elect of the United States, but as a leader of the
Republican party" (76).
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol14/iss4/7
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Cooper’s indictment of Republican policy extends beyond Lincoln’s
inauguration to the new president’s handling of the Confederate siege and then
bombardment and seizure of the federal installation of Fort Sumter. Cooper
reports that Secretary of State William Seward urged Lincoln to abandon Sumter
(as well as southern-based federal customs houses) to the secessionists and to
rest content instead with collecting national tariffs offshore, with federal ships,
while resolving to hold another federal installation (Ft. Pickens in Florida) at all
costs. Cooper’s evident approval of that plan implies that it might have avoided
war. He also wishes that Lincoln had responded to Sumter’s bombardment and
surrender not by calling up troops but by declaring the clash there “a last
opportunity, even a requirement, for Americans on both sides to turn from
employing arms to searching for a peaceful solution" (270).
We Have the War upon Us displays some of the qualities for which
Cooper’s earlier works have justly been praised. The author accurately
summarizes many of the reasons why southern political leaders reacted as
strongly as they did to Lincoln’s election. He has carefully researched and
explained, at some length, the various compromise proposals advanced in these
months. His account of the showdown over Ft. Sumter is painstakingly detailed.
Along the way, Cooper quite accurately notes that throughout the secession
season, Lincoln – a professed admirer of Henry Clay – refused the role of “the
Great Pacficator" that Clay had played during the sectional crises of 1820 and
1850 (72). Cooper’s writing throughout is transparent, direct, and accessible,
increasing the likelihood that his book will attract and possibly convince many
readers.
But this book suffers from weaknesses that, in my view, considerably
outweigh its strengths.
The first is the presence in the text of a surprising number of significant
errors of fact that combine to overstate his case. In rejecting the Republicans’
tenuous claim to basic continuity with the Constitution’s framers, for example,
Cooper goes too far, asserting that “the Founding Fathers had not circumscribed
slavery" (16). But of course the famous Northwest Ordinance did indeed do that,
banning slavery outright in the lands north of the Ohio River between the
Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. Cooper also mischaracterizes
the program of the abolitionists in and out of the Republican Party. As other
historians have been at pains to point out, nearly all of the people in question
called not for “an immediate end to slavery" but for immediate steps to bring
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2012
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slavery to an eventual end. Those were two very different things.
The book’s second, and more important, group of problems is interpretive.
At a number of points Cooper seems to question slavery’s real centrality to the
southern white cause and therefore to secession and war. Similarly, as he
narrates the cotton states’ decision to secede, Cooper attributes the ultimate
assent to that course by ex-unionists there chiefly to their “loyalty to their states"
-- rather than to their own oft-stated concerns about slavery’s future, which
sharpened as it became clear that Lincoln would not repudiate his party’s
platform (135).
The same kind of problem plagues Cooper’s treatment of the upper South
and the reason its four states joined the Confederacy after Sumter. Here he seems
to switch interpretations in mid-stream. Much of the book, as already noted, is a
sustained indictment of the Republicans’ refusal of the Crittenden-type deals,
strongly implying that this bad policy stance lost the upper South to the Union
(101, 173). But elsewhere, in attributing woeful consequences to Lincoln’s
response to Sumter, Cooper denies that the issue of slavery in the territories had
ever, in fact, been a real sectional deal-breaker. In this part of the argument, he
holds that Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee would not have
left the Union, that only “overt acts against the South and slavery" could (and
did) have driven them out (168). Cooper seems aware that leaders of every one
of those had said the opposite – making Lincoln’s repudiation of his party’s
stand against slavery’s further expansion a condition for their remaining in the
Union. He does not tell us why we should doubt those threatening manifestoes.
There are other problems as well. After depicting Seward’s advice in the
Sumter crisis (abandon southern-based customs houses and collect tariffs with
the navy, abandon that fort but hold Pickens) as an enlightened alternative to
Lincoln’s actual policy, Cooper then concedes that even that course of action
would eventually have led to war (251-2, 265). And here he is certainly right.
The seceding states demanded the complete and total surrender of all federal
claims to act as their national government, and (as Sumter demonstrated) their
leaders were more than ready to enforce those words with deeds. But this fact
logically prompts the question, what policy does Cooper think Lincoln should
have adopted?
But I believe the book’s most debilitating weakness is this: By focusing so
narrowly on the words and deeds of a relative handful of political leaders in
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol14/iss4/7
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Washington over the course of a few months, it gives readers little sense of just
how divergent had been the paths of social, economic, and political development
taken by the slave and free states over the preceding decades and how sharply
opposed their basic economic, social, and moral interests and values had thereby
become. We Have the War upon Us consequently obscures rather than
illuminates exactly why there remained so few mutually acceptable courses of
action by 1860-61.
Cooper’s analysis is especially weak concerning the ideals and corollary
beliefs that shaped the conduct of Lincoln, his party, and their constituents
during these crucial months. The sensitivity and perceptiveness that in the past
have served him so well when studying the South seem to fail him as he now
turns his attention to the North. He seems unaware, or at least takes little note of
that fact that so many northerners, by this point, had become quite convinced
that slavery’s indefinite survival, much less its further spread, represented a
mortal threat to the republic, its economic development, political health, and
moral sense.
In his inattention to that fact, William Cooper is a bit reminiscent of Henry
Clay, whose conduct he wishes Lincoln had chosen to emulate. During the
sectional conflict of 1850, Clay urged northerners to make “larger and more
expansive concessions than … the slave States" on the grounds that the South
had much more at stake than did the North. “In the one scale," Clay admonished,
“we behold sentiment, sentiment, sentiment alone; in the other, property, the
social fabric, life, and all that makes life desirable and happy."4 Five years later,
as it happens, Lincoln’s Kentucky friend Joshua Speed tried the same line of
argument on him. Lincoln replied with asperity that Speed had no right “to
assume, that I have no interest in a thing which has, and continually exercises,
the power of making me miserable. You ought rather to appreciate how much the
great body of the Northern people do crucify their feelings" in making
concessions to slavery for the sake of preserving the Union.5
Lincoln, his colleagues, and the northerners who in their majority now
backed them viewed the actually very limited Republican program as the
minimum needed to counter slavery’s threat to their interests and values. It had
taken decades of often-frustrated effort to bring a mass party into being on that
program. That party had now finally and legally won the presidency.
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Most slaveholders recognized in that fact a mortal danger to the form of
society that gave them their wealth, power, social status, and self-image, a type
of society to which they had therefore become tenaciously attached. Those of the
lower South believed that nothing but physical separation from the Union could
now save them and their beloved society. Those of the upper South hoped to use
the Union’s impending breakup as a means with which to coerce the Republicans
into capitulation.
And what if those would-be compromisers had succeeded in their
intentions? What if the Republicans had done as Cooper today wishes? What
would that have meant for the nation, its people, and their future?
The author refers once, early in the book, to “the human tragedy of slavery"
(12). But he then neglects the impact that the policies he retrospectively
advocates would have had on the four million human beings most directly and
terribly affected by that tragedy. The political outlook that held up sectional
peace and conciliation as the supreme standard of right would have kept those
people in chains – along with an unknown number of their descendants.
That is true in part, by the way, because Lincoln and other Republicans were
quite right to fear that abandoning their core program in the face of slave-owner
blackmail would thoroughly demoralize and destroy their party. It may seem
self-evident to Cooper that allowing concerns about that party’s health and
survival to influence policy decisions meant spurning statesmanship for the sake
of narrow, base, careerist concerns. But for earnest opponents of slavery and the
slaveowners in 1860-61, striving to preserve the Republican Party was a
necessary part of genuine statesmanship. That hard-won party embodied the only
plausible hope of wresting the nation and its government from the hands of
slaveowners and their friends, who had controlled it for nearly all of its life. If
that party now collapsed or disintegrated, those hopes would be dashed for the
indefinite future. (And if the Republican party collapsed, furthermore,
facilitating the slaveowners’ recapture of the federal executive branch, then
attempts to annex and turn Cuba and/or parts of central America into slave states
would have become far less far-fetched than William J. Cooper assumes.)
Lincoln’s refusal to back down in 1860-61 did indeed constitute another step
along the road to war –- a war that not only destroyed the Confederacy and
reunified the country but also broke the national power of the master class and
led by the end of 1865 to the elimination of slavery throughout the United States.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol14/iss4/7
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Those achievements came at a very high price in blood and treasure, it is true.
But was the price too high? Or could these things have been accomplished
without war? If the really fine historian who wrote We Have the War upon Us
thinks so, he has not made that case in this book.
--------------Notes:
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circumlocution of the orthodox Republican doctrine" – that is, it did not concede
the right of slavery to exist in territories. (144-45)
4

Allen Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (New York: Scribner’s, 1947), vol.
1, p. 267.
5

Lincoln to Joshua F. Speed, Aug. 24, 1855, in Lincoln’s Collected Works,
ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953) vol. 2,
p. 320.
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